The Next Generation / Biting the Bullet: The Case for a New NATO Rifle and Machine Gun Cartridge

© Anthony G Williams

This is an extended and revised compilation of two presentations. The first was to the National Defense Industries Association (NDIA) Joint Armaments Conference in Dallas, May 2010. The second was to the Defence IQ Infantry Weapons Conference in London, September 2010.

Selected slides from the PowerPoint presentations are included: the full set of NDIA slides is available on their website HERE

Last amendment: 2 April 2011

THE AFGHAN EXPERIENCE

The conflict in Afghanistan, with its emphasis on targeting specific enemy individuals while avoiding collateral damage, demands the use of weapons of high precision and limited destructive effect. As a result, infantry small arms have a much more prominent role than that expected in conventional high-intensity warfare and this is highlighting the performance of their ammunition to a greater extent than ever before. Now that several NATO nations have started the process of defining their requirements for the next generation of small arms, this is a rare opportunity to ask the question: is the present combination of 5.56 and 7.62 mm rifle and machine gun cartridges optimal, or could we do better in the next generation?

The British Army has analysed several hundred small-arms engagements in Afghanistan over the past few years. The results are thought-provoking. Ever since World War 2, around 300 metres has been regarded as the normal maximum range for small-arms engagements, but this is not the case in Afghanistan, where ranges are much longer. Apart from the ubiquitous and rather short-ranged AKM rifles, the Taliban are equipped with PKM light machine guns and SVD rifles chambered in the old but powerful 7.62x54R Russian cartridge, and more than half of their attacks are launched from ranges of between 300 and 900 metres.

PROBLEMS WITH 5.56mm AMMUNITION

British foot patrols were initially equipped only with 5.56 guns; the L85A2 rifle, L86A2 Light Support Weapon, and L110A1 Minimi Para light machine gun. However, these weapons have proved inadequate at long range. Whatever performance they may demonstrate on a firing range, a combination of battle experience and the testing of ammunition terminal effectiveness has led to a judgment that the rifle is effective only up to about 300 metres, the light machine gun only 200 metres because of its short barrel. What this means is that more than half the small-arms engagements take place beyond the effective range of the standard British infantry rifle, and about 70% of the engagements are beyond the effective range of short-barrelled carbines like the M4.

The second problem with 5.56 ammunition is its lack of suppressive effect. On most occasions when British foot patrols come under fire, they never see their attackers; the Taliban are skilled at selecting concealed positions for ambush. So the soldiers return fire in the hope of pinning down the enemy long enough for heavier weapons to be brought to bear. Field testing has revealed that the suppressive effect of a small-arms bullet is directly proportional to the loudness of the sonic bang it generates, and in turn that is directly proportional to its size. 5.56 bullets have only half the suppressive radius of 7.62 fire, exacerbated by the fact that the little bullets are more affected by wind drift and therefore less likely to get close to the target at long range. This is supported by battlefield reports that the Taliban take little notice of 5.56 suppressive fire.

These issues are discussed in more detail in THIS report by Nicholas Drummond and myself.

This lack of effective range and suppressive effect are the two major concerns with 5.56 ammunition reported by the British Army, but there have also been complaints about two other issues which have long been highlighted in the USA and widely reported: erratic terminal effectiveness, even within its effective range, and poor barrier penetration. Erratic terminal effectiveness is mainly due to the fact that while the M855 bullet is capable of inflicting severe injuries at shorter ranges, it frequently does not yaw rapidly on impact but may instead pass through most of the body point-first, inflicting a relatively minor injury unless it happens to strike a vital organ. There is anecdotal evidence aplenty of erratic effectiveness in combat (most recently in a report from the Royal Marines which comments that it can take up to 15 hits to stop an attacker at close range), and this has been confirmed by laboratory testing, which reveals that 85% of the bullets do not start to yaw until they have penetrated at least 120mm (which could take them most of the way through a body). Problems with penetrating intermediate barriers such as walls or car doors and even windscreens have also been confirmed in laboratory testing. THIS 2008 presentation by Dr Roberts detailed these problems and illustrated the results of laboratory testing. The commander of the German troops in Afghanistan made similar complaints in 2009 about the poor effectiveness and barrier penetration of 5.56 ammunition. Interestingly, the British Army recently adopted a semi-automatic shotgun to provide more reliable close-range effectiveness than 5.56 weapons.

A recent analysis by Major Thomas P. Ehrhart, United States Army, of the performance of US Army small arms in Afghanistan makes similar points to the British studies concerning typical engagement ranges and the limited effective range of 5.56mm weapons, and also stresses the importance of marksmanship training. In 2010 the US Army's Soldier Weapons Assessment Team carried out interviews with soldiers in theatre to discover any issues. The need for their carbines to be effective beyond 500 metres was one of the key requests from troops. The 7.62 M14 Enhanced Battle Rifle is proving so popular that the troops want it to be an organic part of squad equipment. And the 7.62 MK48 light machine gun is increasingly being carried instead of the 5.56 M249: as the Team put it; "lethality trumps weight reduction when extended ranges are required".

These shortcomings mean that British foot patrols now carry 7.62mm weapons in place of some of their 5.56 guns; the very effective L7A2 GPMG (similar to the US Army's M240) and the new L129A1 sharpshooter rifle, of which 440 were purchased early in 2010 as an Urgent Operational Requirement specifically to overcome the lack of range of 5.56mm weapons. The problem with the GPMG is that both the gun and its ammunition are very heavy; most unwelcome given that reducing the burden of around 100 lbs worn and borne by the infantryman is one of the top equipment priorities of the British Army. The Army is therefore planning to adopt lighter 7.62 machine guns; a lightened version of the GPMG was examined but interest now seems to have shifted to an even lighter 7.62 LMG (such as the 7.62mm version of the FN MINIMI) which will match the characteristics of the Russian PKM. Little can be done about the weight of the ammunition, however; a key issue with belt-fed machine guns.

US forces have recently adopted new 5.56mm ammunition with the aim of replacing the M855. In mid-2010 the US Army started to field the M855A1 EPR (Enhanced Performance Round, previously known as the LFS=Lead Free Slug), while the USMC selected in early 2010 the MK318 Mod 0 SOST (Special Operations Science & Technology). Both rounds are claimed to offer better performance from short-barrelled carbines, improved barrier penetration and more reliable terminal effectiveness. The M855A1 also penetrates more armour and contains no lead. While final verdicts must await combat experience, these new rounds may resolve the M855's penetration and effectiveness issues, but as their exterior ballistics match the M855 (to avoid sight changes) they will not eliminate the need for larger-calibre small arms to cover the longer ranges.

THE "GOLF BAG" APPROACH: A MIX OF 5.56mm AND 7.62mm WEAPONS

That brings us up to date. 7.62 guns are being used much more widely, although their ammunition is big and heavy and generates three to four times as much recoil energy as 5.56. Heavy recoil in a rifle makes it more difficult to train recruits, reduces accuracy, slows down rapid semi-automatic fire and makes fully automatic fire virtually uncontrollable. I have tried the 7.62 FN SCAR-H currently being acquired by the US Special Operations Command and recoil is sharp even in semi-auto fire. I was told by a soldier with extensive small-arms experience that only the first round of an automatic burst was likely to hit the target. But the 7.62 gets the job done, so do we really need a new cartridge? As you can see, the 7.62 weighs twice as much as the 5.56 and has almost twice the power. The 7.62 weapons can deal with the long-range work, with 5.56 carbines retained for urban fighting.

One problem with this is that it may not be possible to draw neat lines around scenarios: a patrol may be clearing houses in a village at one moment then come under long-range fire as they leave. It means that those carrying 7.62 weapons will be less well equipped for the close-quarter battle, while those with 5.56 guns will be unable to participate in long-range engagements or even to pass their ammunition over to those with 7.62 guns, thereby reducing the effective firepower of the section. Finally, it still leaves us with the 7.62's weight and recoil, plus the erratic terminal effectiveness and poor barrier penetration of the 5.56 M855 (even if they work as advertised, the new US 5.56mm rounds may not be acceptable to European nations, as we shall see).

Furthermore, the sudden proliferation of new small arms has increased the total number of portable firearms to six (not including sniper rifles): the three original 5.56 guns and three 7.62 ones: the L129A1, L7A2 and forthcoming LMG. If it's any comfort, the US Army and Marine Corps use eight between them: four in each calibre (M4, M16, M27 and M249 in 5.56; M14EBR, M110, M240 and MK48 in 7.62). Despite this proliferation of weapons and all that entails for training and support, this does nothing to solve the erratic terminal effectiveness and poor barrier penetration of the 5.56, along with the 7.62's weight and recoil. The evidence suggests that we can do better.
 

Let us first consider what we want infantry rifles and light machine guns to achieve. I suggest the following:

MILITARY CARTRIDGE REQUIREMENTS

First, their bullets should be capable of reliably inflicting sufficiently serious wounds to ensure that the enemy is normally put out of action quickly by a centre-mass (torso) hit, within the effective range of the weapon and allowing for the current preference in many armies for short-barrelled carbines.

Secondly, their bullets should be capable of penetrating a wide range of intermediate barriers while still maintaining their trajectory afterwards; what's known as "barrier blind".

Thirdly, sharpshooter rifles and LMGs should have the range to match an enemy using full-power 7.62 weapons, since these are in widespread use and likely to remain so.

Finally, the weapons and their ammunition should have the lightest weight and lowest recoil consistent with the first three requirements.

These requirements are all essentially dependent on the right choice of ammunition. The first three can clearly be met by the 7.62 cartridge but this falls down badly on the fourth. The 5.56 round delivers the opposite results.

APPROACHES FOR MEETING THE REQUIREMENTS

There are several possible approaches:

1. Retain the 5.56 and 7.62, but introduce an improved 5.56 loading.

2. Return to using the 7.62 in all weapons, preferably with an improved loading.

3. Replace the 5.56 with a more effective short to medium range cartridge, retaining the 7.62 in sharpshooter rifles and MGs.

4. Replace both existing rounds in the infantry section with a new intermediate cartridge with good long-range performance.

The pros and cons of these options can be summarised as follows:

Option 1: Various attempts have been and continue to be made to upgrade the performance of the 5.56 cartridge; in US service we have seen the MK262 and now the MK318 Mod 0 and the M855A1 and these offer some improvements in performance. While final verdicts must await combat experience, these new rounds may mitigate the M855's penetration and effectiveness problems, but as their exterior ballistics match the M855 they will not eliminate the need for larger-calibre small arms to cover the longer ranges. In any case, the degree of improvement is fundamentally limited by the small size and modest power of the cartridge. It's worth remembering that in many US states and in the UK, the 5.56 cartridge is considered insufficiently powerful to hunt anything other than small game, even with the more effective expanding bullets.

Furthermore, the MK262 and MK318 have open-point bullets, which are regarded as unacceptable by the British and other European countries, for reasons which are worth a short digression. Declaration III of the 1899 Hague Convention, states that: "The Contracting Parties agree to abstain from the use of bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core, or is pierced with incisions". US lawyers argue that the bullets are not designed to expand, so the clause does not apply; European lawyers point to the specific wording which prohibits jackets which do not entirely cover the core. The M855A1 bullet also has a jacket which does not cover the core, which is exposed at the tip. What's more, like the M855 the M855A1 appears to rely on bullet fragmentation to maximise its soft-target effectiveness (it fragments to lower impact velocities, i.e. longer ranges) which is also regarded as unacceptable by UK lawyers because of the rather vague wording of the Geneva Conventions which prohibits the use of "weapons, projectiles and material and methods of war of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering". The original British L2A1 5.56mm ball bullet did fragment in a similar way to the M855, but this was prevented in the current L2A2 pattern by using a thicker jacket. As a result of all this, the US rounds are very unlikely to be approved as NATO standards, although they may of course be adopted by individual NATO nations depending on the particular interpretation of international law which they accept. It also seems unlikely that the British lead-free 5.56 round currently being developed by BAE, which has a steel core, will offer the effectiveness improvements claimed for the M855A1.

Option 2: The 7.62 M80 is an old design which is effective but not very efficient. It is not efficient for two reasons. First, because the bullet does not usually yaw very rapidly on impact. Second, it has an unimpressive long-range performance for its calibre due to the poor aerodynamics of the bullet which sheds velocity quite quickly. It is effective simply through the size and power of the bullet which delivers considerable terminal effectiveness and barrier penetration, but that power has a serious cost in weight and recoil. Some improvements could be made by introducing a more modern and efficient loading, but apart from sniper loadings the only one to emerge so far - the new MK319 - also relies on an open-point bullet. In any case, lack of performance is not the problem. Interestingly, the Royal Marines' report referred to previously expresses such dissatisfaction with the current 5.56mm that it suggests that 7.62mm might be considered for the next rifle to replace the L85A2.

Option 3: To achieve a worthwhile performance increase over the 5.56 it is necessary to move to a larger calibre with increased case capacity. There will be some penalties in the form of increased weight and recoil, but it isn't necessary to go anywhere near the figures for the 7.62. The most thorough recent attempt emerged a few years ago as a joint effort between Remington and some soldiers within SOCOM; the 6.8x43 Remington Special Purpose Cartridge, or SPC. Muzzle energy and ammunition weight are half-way between the 5.56 and 7.62. Tests indicate that its terminal effectiveness and barrier penetration are very impressive, albeit achieved with an open-point bullet. The additional recoil is quite modest, feeling much closer to the 5.56 than it does to the 7.62, as I had an opportunity to confirm for myself, courtesy of Heckler & Koch. This is despite the fact that the HK416/6.8 is lighter than the big HK417. These impressions have been confirmed by US tests of the speed and accuracy of fire from 5.56 and 6.8 guns - there is little or no difference. However, the long-range performance, while better than the 5.56, is not good enough to replace the 7.62 as it is limited by the relatively short and light bullet needed to keep the overall length the same as the 5.56mm.

Option 4: This option is based on the fact that once you are in the size and performance class of the 6.8 Remington, the right choice of calibre and bullet can match the long-range performance of the 7.62 M80 with a much lower ammunition weight and recoil. This therefore opens the possibility of one common general-purpose round used by the weapons carried by the infantry section. While the extra range would initially benefit sharpshooters and LMGs and may not be needed in assault rifles, it does give them the potential for delivering long-range harassing fire given the increasing use of telescopic sights and bipods, provided of course that appropriate training is given. Furthermore, advanced sights currently under development could enable all riflemen to fire effectively at long range. If a single general-purpose round can be achieved, the benefits resulting from all of the weapons within the section being suited to use at all combat ranges, plus the simplification of weapon and ammunition acquisition, logistics and training would, I suggest, make this the most attractive option.

AMMUNITION HISTORY - WE NEARLY MADE IT TWICE BEFORE!

It is worth taking a brief look at what we can learn from cartridges developed in the past, before considering the specifications which could deliver Option 4.

The US Army came close to adopting an intermediate, general-purpose cartridge over 75 years ago. Following exhaustive testing by the Army's Caliber Board, the .30'06 round was very nearly replaced in the 1930s by the .276 Pedersen. The British were very interested in this cartridge and even established an ammunition production line (the example in this photo was made in England) but it was rejected by the US Army mainly on cost grounds, because of the large stocks of .30'06 ammunition.

The next attempt took place in the years following World War 2 during the trials to select NATO's first standard rifle and machine gun cartridge. As a result of WW2 experience there was a strong wish in both the US and British armies to adopt one general-purpose selective-fire rifle to replace the proliferation of weapons in service. The British wanted a rifle compact and controllable enough in automatic fire to replace sub-machine guns as well as the .303 rifle, the Americans wanted one which would replace their M1 Garand rifle, M2 Carbine, Browning Automatic Rifle and M3 sub-machine gun. For the NATO tests Britain submitted a new 7mm round co-developed with Belgium and supported by Canada. Various designations were used as it developed, starting with the .276, then the .280, the .280/30 and finally the 7mm Mk 1Z, although it is now often referred to as the 7x43. This used a long, heavy bullet which lost velocity more slowly than the 7.62's, enabling it to deliver more energy at long range despite a lower muzzle energy, with less weight and recoil. The British designed the EM-2 bullpup rifle around this cartridge in order to achieve the short gun needed for urban fighting combined with the long barrel needed for long-range fire. This combination was compact and controllable enough to replace sub-machine guns as well as the old .303 rifles. It was, for a time, officially adopted by the British Army. However, this had to be cancelled when the US Army insisted on their new .30 calibre cartridge which was duly adopted as the 7.62 NATO. Unfortunately, this is just as powerful as the old full-power rifle/MG rounds which had seen service in both World Wars and, as we have seen, generates so much recoil that effective automatic rifle fire proved impossible.

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There have since been other attempts at a new intermediate cartridge. The British developed an interesting 6.25mm cartridge around 1970, but this was not designed for very long range and used a relatively light bullet. The other two shown here are particularly relevant because they achieved a good long-range performance from a small cartridge by using a heavy bullet at a medium velocity. One was a US Army project from around 1970; the 6 x 45, for use in a squad automatic weapon. This was intended to provide superior long-range performance to the 5.56 for use in a squad automatic weapon, but was abandoned when improved 5.56 ammunition was promised. Well, this eventually arrived as the M855. The most recent attempt to deliver high energy to long range by firing a heavy, reduced calibre bullet at a moderate muzzle velocity is the 6.5 Grendel from Alexander Arms.

Let's look at how the two most recent cartridges perform compared with the service rounds. This chart of bullet energy at different ranges compares the 7.62 with the 5.56, the 6.8 Remington and the 6.5 Grendel.

Two things are obvious: first, that the initial performance gaps between the 5.56 and the 6.8, and between the 6.8 and the 7.62, become steadily wider with increasing range. The second point is that the 6.5 performs differently; while starting with a muzzle energy similar to the 6.8, its more aerodynamic bullet allows it to match the 7.62 at long range. It also offers a flatter trajectory and much less wind drift despite its lower muzzle velocity. These 6.5mm results were obtained with the use of a low-drag target bullet, but a ball round of the same weight and shape shouldn't be far behind. The four rounds are shown together here with their bullets. Note that the design of the 6.8 and 6.5 was constrained by having to fit within a converted AR-15, so the total length had to be the same as the 5.56. This prevents the 6.8 from using long bullets with good long-range performance. With a new calibre and family of weapons, this need not be a requirement.

CHARACTERISTICS OF GENERAL PURPOSE CARTRIDGES

Taking all of these issues into account, it is possible to draw up the characteristics of cartridges to meet the requirements. I suggest that the minimum calibre to be effective enough to replace the 7.62 would be 6.5mm, while the maximum calibre to keep ammunition weight and recoil within acceptable limits would be 7mm. The cartridge should use a low-drag bullet to achieve a good long-range performance, but fired at only a medium velocity to minimise ammunition weight and recoil. Muzzle energy, weight and calculated recoil should be approximately midway between the 5.56 and 7.62 - similar to the 6.8 Remington and 6.5 Grendel. The bullet's performance at 1,000 metres should be comparable with the 7.62 M80, as measured by hit probability (a function of trajectory and susceptibility to wind drift) and damage potential (bullet energy).

The bullet should be optimised for the anti-personnel role and must be designed to yaw rapidly and reliably on impact to maximise its effectiveness, as well as being "barrier blind". To satisfy European requirements, an effective FMJ bullet must be developed as the primary loading. More specialised armour-piercing rounds could be designed for issue when needed. To sum up, the cartridges would have ballistic characteristics similar to the 6.5 Grendel at the bottom end of the calibre range and the 7x43 at the top.

The table above shows some possible options for a general purpose cartridge in 6.5, 6.8 and 7mm calibres, compared with the existing 5.56 and 7.62 rounds. Any of these could do the job; they just have slightly different pros and cons, with the 6.5 offering the lowest recoil, lightest weight and flattest trajectory, the 7mm perhaps being the most effective - that would remain to be tested. This photo is not really serious; the three cartridges on the right are photographic mock-ups to give an impression of what conventional versions of a new general-purpose round could look like. There are other options, of course.

It should also be noted that the choice of bullet materials may influence the calibre selection. With conventional lead-cored ammunition the 6.5mm calibre is probably the optimum, but when using lighter materials such as steel, the heavy, low-drag bullets become very long, which may cause packaging and even stabilising problems (a bullet length of six times the calibre being regarded as the maximum for rifling-induced spin-stabilisation); a slightly larger calibre could suffer less from this.

Despite the development of improved 5.56mm ammunition for US forces it is interesting that, according to rumours circulating among the small-arms community, the US Army's ARDEC Small Caliber Munitions Technology Branch has carried out a calibre study, with the results emerging in March 2011. A wide range of criteria were examined including: penetration; terminal effectiveness; accuracy; initial, retained and striking energy; wind drift; stowed kills; and recoil. The existing 5.56mm and 7.62mm rounds were compared with 6.5mm and 7mm, in all cases when loaded with similar bullets (copper or copper+steel - the latter presumably like the M855A1). The overall outcome of the study was that both 6.5mm and 7mm comprehensively outperformed both 5.56mm and 7.62mm. This conclusion is supported by a growing view that the next US rifle should be effective at ranges of up to 600m and that 5.56mm could not deliver this, no matter what bullets were loaded. The outcome of this study should hardly be a surprise, since as Major Ehrhart observed in his study mentioned above: "The 2006 study by the Joint Service Wound Ballistics – Integrated Product Team discovered that the ideal caliber seems to be between 6.5 and 7-mm. This was also the general conclusion of all military ballistics studies since the end of World War I."

You may have noticed that I have said nothing so far about advanced ammunition concepts; cases of stainless steel, light-alloy or polymer or entirely caseless, and perhaps of telescoped design. That is because I am primarily concerned with the performance of the bullet after it has left the gun; how it gets to that point is a secondary issue. I will merely comment that if an entirely new gun and ammunition system such as LSAT were to be adopted, it would in my opinion be a terrible waste of an opportunity if this merely replicated a calibre we already have, simply because we already have it. An LSAT intermediate-calibre round would weigh no more than the current 5.56mm, which would of course make the intermediate concept even more attractive: the arguments for LSAT and for a general-purpose round are mutually supportive.

OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES

Finally, I would like to address a few of the objections to the proposed general purpose cartridge, because I've heard a lot of them!

1. "The problem is not the ammunition, it's the training: just train soldiers to shoot straight." Of course, training is by far the most important element in soldier performance, and given the current emphasis on infantry small-arms the development and maintenance of rifle-shooting skills should be a high priority for all infantry, not just for a few marksmen. However, it is unrealistic to expect soldiers in combat to hit a small strip a few inches wide running from the forehead to the upper chest, as I have seen suggested as a solution to the 5.56's effectiveness problem. In any case, we go to a lot of trouble and expense to make sure that our troops are well trained and equipped; why shouldn't they also have the most effective weapons we can provide? At the very least, it can't hurt morale to have weapons which the soldier is confident can do what's needed over any likely engagement ranges.

2. "Ammunition with very long range capability is wasted in a rifle anyway, because only snipers and marksmen are trained to shoot that far." For now, the long-range capability would primarily be of benefit in LMGs and sharpshooter rifles, but advanced sights currently in development include laser rangefinders and ballistic computers and can also take into account crosswinds and other variables. Although initially for snipers, it is not difficult to predict that they will become small and inexpensive enough to be available for infantry rifles within the foreseeable future. These will do for long-range rifle shooting what precision guidance kits have done for aircraft bombs, and will enable an average soldier to deliver accurate rifle fire to long range.

3. "The extra weight of an intermediate cartridge over the 5.56 would increase the soldier's burden." This may be true (although advanced ammunition developments such as part-polymer cases or the LSAT programme have the potential to keep the weight down to levels comparable with the current 5.56mm), but there would be a weight saving compared with 7.62 which is increasingly being carried, especially for machine guns.

4. "Fiddling with the calibres isn't worth the effort; there is no such thing as a 'golden bullet' that will put the enemy down first shot every time." This is true, but it's a question of probability: how often will the cartridge fail to do the job? Both combat experience and lab testing indicate that, other things being equal, the smaller and less powerful the cartridge, the more likely it is to fail.

5. "Small arms don't matter at long range - immediate heavy fire support will always be on call." This may not necessarily be the case in counter-insurgency scenarios when foot patrols may be thinly spread over a wide area. And even when it is, the risk of collateral damage may restrict its use: US artillery and air support has been considerably restricted in Afghanistan for this reason. As General Petraeus said recently: "Every Afghan civilian death diminishes our cause." Use of excessive force, he argued, could turn "tactical victories" into "strategic setbacks".

6. "The calibre of the small arms will have no effect on the outcome of a war." The same could be said about most other military equipment, and it isn't really the point: the effectiveness of their small arms makes a great deal of difference to the soldiers whose lives may depend upon them.

7. "It would cost too much to change calibres, there are other priorities for our limited funds." Clearly we have budgetary problems and I am not suggesting any immediate change - developing new ammunition and weapons will take years anyway. However, the guns are wearing out and a new generation of small arms needs to be bought by the end of the decade, providing an opportunity to phase in a new calibre. This would especially be true if LSAT were to be adopted. And adopting one general-purpose cartridge would halve the number of different weapons required, saving money in the long run on acquisition, training and support.

8. "Afghanistan is not typical in its emphasis on long-range fire; if we changed calibres we would be equipping for the last war, not the next one." Current thinking in both the British and US Armies is that counter-insurgency warfare will remain the most probable type of conflict. That means the infantry and their weapons will remain key elements. If you look at the less stable parts of the world, such conflicts are just as likely as not to take place in areas where there are opportunities for long-range fire. It is worth emphasising that full-power 7.62 rifles and machine guns are still in common use around the world, and facing an enemy armed with these puts troops equipped with 5.56 weapons at a disadvantage, increasingly so as the range lengthens. It is unlikely to be an accident that Taliban attacks are so frequently launched at long range - they will know the limitations of the 5.56. Besides, what would be the downside of adopting an intermediate calibre even if future combat is at shorter ranges? We would still benefit from ammunition that is much more effective than 5.56 at any range while being lighter and more controllable than 7.62. Would that be so bad?

9. "We would never get all of the NATO nations to agree to change to a new intermediate cartridge." We don't have to. The US Army unilaterally adopted the 5.56mm round about fifteen years before NATO (and even then, some NATO nations didn't switch to the 5.56mm for a long time). For pistols and SMGs the 9x19 is the only NATO-standardised cartridge, which hasn't stopped Germany and Norway from adopting the 4.6mm or Belgium the 5.7mm. Even the fervently law-abiding UK has adopted the .338 LM for sniper rifles - which is not NATO standardised. And does anyone seriously imagine that if the US decides to go for LSAT they would wait until all of NATO agreed before making the move? Realistically, it could be problematic for the UK to adopt a new standard rifle/MG cartridge without the USA being on board; but if they are, what the rest of NATO decides doesn't really matter.

A MODEST PROPOSAL

What I am proposing is a small-scale research and development project which examines the calibre, ballistics and bullet design of an optimum general purpose cartridge and produces one or more conventional rounds for thorough testing in suitably modified existing guns, preferably including active service. This could provide valuable input into advanced ammunition projects like LSAT, and would also act as a back-up, ready to go into production if needed. The cost and risks would be very low, the potential benefits substantial.

Ironically, the EM-2's 7x43 cartridge might actually prove to be a good basis for such tests since it has the same case diameter as the 7.62 NATO, so rebarrelling existing 7.62 weapons should in principle be easy. Even the same belt links can be used.

This is not rocket science. We could have gone down this path decades ago, first with the .276 Pedersen, then with the 7x43, and we should not, yet again, miss the opportunity to do so in our next generation of small arms.

SUMMARY

1. The limited, counter-insurgency type of warfare seen in Afghanistan is likely to recur in future conflicts. Such conflicts put the emphasis on dismounted infantry operations, because of the need to provide a reassuring presence to the population. The need to minimise the risk of civilian casualties or other unintended damage also puts the emphasis on high-precision weapons of limited destructiveness, particularly small arms.

2. Small arms engagements may take place anywhere between 0 and 900+ metres.

3. 5.56 ammunition has limited range, and effectiveness problems even at short range when using NATO-standard ammunition; 7.62 ammunition suffers from weight and recoil issues.

4. It is now technically feasible to develop a combination of weapon, ammunition and sights which is effective across the entire 0-900m range. The enhanced firepower and flexibility this would offer over a mixed-calibre squad, plus the savings in procurement, logistics and training, make this a desirable aim for the next generation of small arms.

5. Work should therefore be undertaken to determine the optimum ballistic performance of a standard small-arms cartridge and to develop ammunition, weapons and sights accordingly.
 

A follow-up article looking at the characteristics of the next generation of military small arms is HERE

A history of the development of assault rifles and their ammunition is HERE

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